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The US–China trade dispute: phase two
Jakub Jakóbowski
Donald Trump has pursued his strategy of stepping up pressure on Beijing by threatening 
it with a tariff war since March 2018. The aim of this strategy is to resolve the problems 
in US–China economic relations that have been mounting for years. These problems include 
China’s constant trade surplus with the US, the limitations regarding access to the Chinese 
market, and the cases of technology theft or forced transfer from US companies. The tariffs 
imposed so far are of negligible significance for trade exchange, although on 6 July Wash-
ington plans to announce a 25% tariff on the import of high-technology goods from China, 
worth US$34 billion (this amount could be increased to US$50 billion). Should China introduce 
its announced retaliatory measures, the tariff dispute could cover goods worth around US$95 
billion, or around 15% of US–China trade exchange (see Appendix). President Trump has al-
ready announced that goods imported from China worth another US$200 billion would be 
covered by tariffs, should China fail to make concessions.
In contrast to the previous phases of negotiations, the US’s present demands focus on long-
term structural problems rather than specific benefits for American business. Thereby, the 
formula of talks based on seeking spectacular agreements (‘deals’) that Trump had initially 
adopted is losing ground. This heralds a launch of another phase of negotiations, this time 
more comprehensive and more difficult for China. Until recently, Beijing had tried to contain 
the dispute by making minor concessions. At the same time, it is communicating its readiness 
to offer a symmetrical response to the American strikes. China is also trying to take advantage 
of its dispute with the US by applying diplomatic measures to position itself as a defender of 
globalisation and multilateral trade rules. The tools the US is using may disrupt global supply 
chains in the high-technology sector, which in turn may impact the economic condition of 
America’s allies in the European Union and in East Asia.
The tariff war as a negotiation strategy
The US’s strategy of increasing pressure on Beijing 
by threatening it with a tariff war reflects an evo-
lution that has taken place since the beginning 
of Donald Trump’s presidency. During his 2017 
meetings with President Xi Jinping, he offered 
China an open-dialogue formula which was main-
ly intended to boost America’s exports to China 
and open the Chinese market to American-made 
goods. As a consequence, agreements (mostly 
non-binding) were signed for the sale of US-made 
products and services worth US$250 billion, and 
the so-called 100-Day Action Plan was devised 
regarding the opening of the Chinese market 
(for example to American financial institutions). 
According to the US, the Chinese failed to fully 
implement the agreements. As a consequence, 
in March 2018 Trump adopted the tactics of step-
ping up tensions by threatening a tariff war. 
In May 2018, a series of meetings between del-
egations responsible for resolving the deepen-
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ing conflict were held. The delegations were 
headed by Steven Mnuchin, the US Secretary of 
the Treasury, and Liu He, China’s deputy prime 
minister for economic affairs. Washington in-
tended to resolve their long-term problems and 
demanded that China promise to decrease its 
annual trade surplus with the US by US$200 
billion to 2020. On 20 May 2018, China com-
mitted itself to boost its import of foodstuffs 
and energy (including the LNG) from the US, 
while avoiding quoting any specific figures. 
According to American negotiators, the threat 
of a trade war “had been suspended”, which 
the Chinese side interpreted as the US’s with-
drawal from its announced second wave of 
tariffs, and as a negotiation success for Beijing. 
A joint statement published after the negotia-
tions made only negligible references to the is-
sue of protecting American technologies, which 
is of key importance for American big business. 
On 30 May 2018, Washington announced that 
it would continue to impose tariffs on Chinese 
high-technology goods. A detailed list of these 
tariffs was published on 15 June 2018, and they 
are to become effective on 6 July. In addition, 
announcements were made regarding further 
restrictions on Chinese investments in the US 
and control of the export of goods containing 
sensitive technologies to China, which were to 
be introduced on 30 June. However, on 27 June 
the US President withdrew from this decision af-
ter protests by American business. According to 
Trump, should there be no response on how to 
resolve structural problems or should China in-
troduce retaliatory tariffs, the US will impose an-
other 10% tariff on goods worth US$200 billion. 
China criticised Trump for his unexpected about-
turn in the negotiations, withdrew from its pur-
chase declarations, and announced a symmetri-
cal response to the new tariffs (see Appendix).
The negotiation formula adopted by Trump, 
based on seeking spectacular agreements 
(‘deals’), has been losing steam. In a tweet 
on 23 May, Trump himself stated that despite 
a certain progress in the talks with China, the US 
will have to “use a different structure” because 
the formula used so far “will be too hard to get 
done and to verify results”. In a statement de-
livered on 29 May 2018, he referred to structur-
al problems in trade relations with China, and 
stressed that “from now on, we expect trad-
ing relationships to be fair and to be recipro-
cal”. Following the American statements made 
in late May, the talks with China are now en-
tering a new phase, and are no longer based 
on seeking spectacular agreements. Instead, 
they are focused on achieving concessions that 
could lead to structural changes in trade and 
investment relations between the two states. 
America’s demands regarding 
the balancing of economic relations…
China’s trade surplus, which has been un-
changed for years, results from its domestic 
economic policy of offering system-wide sup-
port for the production sector. This involves 
maintaining a fixed yuan-US dollar exchange 
rate and low interest rates for big business, as 
well as curbing the increase of wages, which it 
has done for many years. This policy involves 
offering effective subsidies to the export sec-
tor to ensure its global competitive advantage. 
The surplus dollars earned on exports are in-
vested in the absorbent American capital mar-
ket to finance the US’s imports from China. 
In other words, the long-term deficit in the US’s 
trade with China is financed by way of import-
ing Chinese capital and increasing America’s 
debt to China. The present economic policy of 
states that have a regular surplus in their trade 
China criticised Trump for his unexpect-
ed flip-flop  in the negotiations, withdrew 
from its purchase declarations, and an-
nounced a symmetrical response to the 
new tariffs.
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with the US (aside from China, these include 
Germany, Japan and South Korea) is considered 
unfavourable for the American economy. In the 
real economy, it results in the US losing its com-
petitive advantage and relocating production 
abroad, and in finance it triggers reductions of 
interest rates and the emergence of bubbles on 
the asset markets (this situation was considered 
one of the main causes of the 2008 financial 
crisis). Restoring trade balance between the US 
and China would require reforms on the Chi-
nese side, a partial cancellation of the system of 
subsidies for the production sector, and a boost 
to China’s domestic consumption. Temporary 
initiatives such as China’s ‘purchase missions’ 
to the US or imposing tariffs on a portion of its 
imports are unlikely to resolve the problems of 
the US’s balance of payments in the long run.
Another aspect of the economic dispute be-
tween the US and China involves China’s indus-
trial policy. Beijing supports the development 
of high technologies and the improvement of 
Chinese companies’ positions in global val-
ue chains (for example under the China 2025 
strategy), frequently at the cost of American 
companies. This is done by subsidising Chinese 
companies from the high-tech sector, with 
forced technology transfers from foreign inves-
tors being a condition for gaining access to the 
Chinese market; purchases of American tech 
companies supported by Chinese state-owned 
banks; the theft of intellectual property (sup-
ported by the Chinese state); violation of pat-
ents etc. This affects those sectors that are of 
key importance for long-term competitiveness 
of American industry and services, including 
artificial intelligence, big data, robotics, bio-
technology, aviation and space technologies. 
Reducing the technological gap between China 
and the US in these sectors is viewed as a threat 
to the American economy’s competitive advan-
tage in the long run, as well as a challenge to 
the technological advantage of the US military. 
At the present stage of talks, the US is demand-
ing that China creates ‘equal rules of the game’ 
for companies from the two states; that it opens 
the Chinese market for American investors (in-
cluding in the financial sector); stops the prac-
tice of technology theft or forced transfer; and 
suspends the subsidies for technology compa-
nies offered under the China 2025 programme. 
Aside from instruments connected with addi-
tional tariffs, the Trump administration is de-
veloping alternative measures to put pressure 
on Beijing. The technology security issues have 
been directly linked to trade issues, for example 
by launching a mechanism stipulated in Section 
301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (see Appendix). 
In addition, talks relating to other vital issues 
for China (such as the denuclearisation of North 
Korea) have been linked to trade talks. The US 
has significantly expanded its mechanisms for 
blocking China’s direct investments in America. 
During the spring round of talks, the American 
administration stopped (President Trump al-
legedly did not know about it) the supplies of 
key components (processors) to China’s biggest 
telecommunications company ZTE, forcing it to 
suspend its operations for some time. Non-tariff 
measures to put pressure on China, such as 
blocking Chinese investments in the US (as well 
as America’s allies, for example blocking the 
takeover of the German company Aixtron in 
2016 following suggestions from the CIA) and 
placing an embargo on the export of compo-
nents for selected companies (the case of ZTE), 
make it possible to target Chinese companies 
in a more precise manner.
The United States demands that China 
decrease its trade surplus with the US and 
curb technology transfers from American 
companies.
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…and Beijing’s attempt at de-escalation
China’s negotiation strategy involves offer-
ing symmetrical responses to the American 
threats regarding increased tariffs (see Ap-
pendix). Alongside this, Beijing is also making 
smaller concessions to please Donald Trump, 
by placing media attention on his spectacular 
‘deals’, and to influence him personally (for ex-
ample by supporting Ivanka Trump’s business-
es in China). Examples of this include China’s 
announcement that it would lower the tariffs 
on the import of cars from the US, which was 
offered in response to President Trump’s tweet 
criticising unequal access to the Chinese market 
in this sector, as well as its plans to increase 
its purchases of foodstuffs and energy from 
the US (which are being partly implemented 
under agreements made in 2017). The meet-
ing in Washington in May 2018, which resulted 
in a temporary de-escalation, was described 
by the Chinese media as a success, which post-
poned the threat of a trade war and at the same 
time helped Beijing avoid making concessions 
to the US in matters of vital importance to Chi-
na. Alongside this, Beijing is trying to present 
its domestic economic reform agenda (involv-
ing China becoming more open to the world) 
as a declaration of goodwill towards the US. 
While the need to gradually increase domestic 
consumption (which is a response to domestic 
challenges, but will at the same time help bal-
ance the trade exchange) is indeed one of Chi-
nese government’s priorities, it is unlikely China 
will abandon its key technology development 
programme known as China 2025. This is why 
the concessions Beijing has made so far may be 
viewed as the implementation of measures that 
had long been planned, or are of lesser impor-
tance from the point of view of China’s long-
term economic development strategies.
Beijing is trying to use its dispute with the US 
to position itself as a defender of globalisa-
tion, in contrast to the policy pursued by the 
US, which is referred to as unpredictable and 
protectionist. In its conflict with Washington, 
Beijing is posing as a peace-loving side that is 
only ready to launch an aggressive policy when 
the US starts a trade war. This fits in with Chi-
na’s wider strategy, which was announced by 
Xi Jinping during his speech in Davos in 2017 
and has been pursued since the beginning of 
Donald Trump’s presidency. Beijing is pursuing 
a policy of gradually lowering tariffs on the im-
port of consumer goods, which partly results 
from domestic needs, but is being used to 
stress China’s economic openness. The global 
imports fair which is to take place in Shang-
hai in November 2018 will be a major political 
event attended by delegations from more than 
100 countries (including heads of state) as well 
as representatives of key international organi-
sations (such as the World Trade Organisation 
and the United Nations). China’s dispute with 
the US is also being accompanied by increased 
diplomatic activity, for example in the EU and 
in Japan, connected with a proposed joint re-
sponse to the US’s challenge to the existing 
multilateral trade rules. For example, China has 
declared its will to maintain the World Trade 
Organisation regime and cooperate with Euro-
pean institutions in this respect.
The consequences for the global economy
It is uncertain whether Trump will actually im-
plement these aggressive negotiation strate-
gies, including the potential introduction on 
punitive tariffs on Chinese high-tech goods (see 
Appendix). Trump’s situation is complicated by 
China’s current position in global value chains, 
in particular in advanced technology sectors 
(threatened by the US’s import tariffs). Chinese 
What Beijing offered Donald Trump were 
only minor concessions that do not violate 
China’s strategic economic interests.
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industrial plants produce computers, electronic 
and telecommunications devices for all major 
global producers. According to PIIE’s estimates, 
as much as 80% of products potentially cov-
ered by the tariffs are manufactured in China 
by non-Chinese companies, including compa-
nies from the US (for example products made 
for Apple and nVidia), Japan, Germany, South 
Korea and Taiwan. The tariffs may also impact 
the export of components from these countries 
to China. According to groups in the US which 
oppose Trump’s protectionist agenda, if the tar-
iffs are imposed, this will compromise American 
tech companies’ competitive advantage (be-
cause they will lose access to their production 
base in China), and destabilise the economies of 
America’s allies in East Asia. This narrative has 
been supported by a portion of American busi-
nesses operating in China, for example Apple’s 
CEO Tim Cook. Opinions regarding the dou-
ble-edged nature of the solutions proposed by 
Trump and the threat of destabilisation of glob-
al value chains are also being voiced in China. 
Some commentators and high-tech producers 
claim that the potential losses to the econo-
mies of the US and of its allies would be too 
big, and that Trump was bluffing when he for-
mulated his threats, which are very unlikely to 
be put into practice. However, the beginning of 
July 2018 saw a series of declines on Chinese 
stock markets followed by a major weakening 
of the yuan, which triggered an intervention 
by the Chinese currency regulator. The finan-
cial markets’ nervous reaction indicates that the 
scenario involving imposing tariffs on Chinese 
high-technology products is realistic and likely. 
The US’s increased pressure on Beijing may 
prove to be favourable from the point of view 
of the EU. Reducing China’s trade surplus, coun-
tering China’s industrial espionage and direct 
investments intended to take over technolo-
gies, as well as opening up the Chinese market, 
are all in the EU’s current agenda. This creates 
a potential for cooperation with the American 
administration. On the other hand, the instru-
ments used by Trump pose a number of threats 
to the EU. Introduction of tariffs on high-tech-
nology products may threaten the export to the 
US of goods manufactured in European-owned 
industrial plants located in China (such as Ger-
man cars), and may have a negative impact on 
the use of components manufactured in Europe 
in these plants. Moreover, Trump’s strategy in-
volving bilateral negotiations and the introduc-
tion of tariffs applied outside the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) regime challenges the ex-
isting global rules rules for resolving trade ten-
sions, which may impact the condition of Eu-
ropean companies on third markets. Whether 
these trends are continued will depend on the 
US’s further actions. If Trump’s strategy, which 
is based on bilateral dialogue and protectionist 
instruments, does not prove successful, the US 
may return to putting pressure on China by way 
of multilateral regional trade agreements such 
as TPP and TTIP (which are intended, among 
other things, to set global production stand-
ards that China would have to obey).
If the new tariffs are imposed on 6 July, 
this may disrupt global production chains 
in the high-tech sector, which in turn may 
affect the EU and the East Asian states.
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The trade dispute between the US and China 
was aggravated in the spring of 2018, when 
on 23 March the US imposed tariffs on the im-
port of steel and aluminium (excluding selected 
states, for example NAFTA members, and the 
EU for some time). From China’s perspective, 
this has had limited consequences: in 2017 Chi-
na supplied a mere 6% of America’s imports in 
these categories of goods. Moreover, around 
90% of America’s steel import from China had 
already been covered by anti-dumping tariffs 
under WTO procedures. According to PIIE es-
timates, the tariffs imposed in March 2018 will 
cover China’s exports worth around US$2.8 
billion. On 2 April 2018, China announced that 
it would introduce retaliatory tariffs on Amer-
ican aluminium, pork and fruit, in total cover-
ing around US$2.5 billion of US exports. Aside 
from the tariffs on solar panels and washing 
machines imposed in January 2018, these have 
been the only tariffs introduced in connec-
tion with Trump’s 2018 trade offensive. Their 
impact on US/China trade exchange is negli-
gible (in total they cover goods worth around 
US$5.3 billion, out of US$636 billion of total 
trade exchange).
On 3 April 2018, the US announced a list of 
1333 products imported from China that are to 
be covered by a 25% punitive tariff. The list was 
compiled following analyses carried out pursu-
ant to Section 301 of the US Trade Act of 1974, 
which makes it possible to impose punitive tar-
iffs on trade partners that violate intellectual 
property laws. The tariff is to cover high-tech-
nology products including computers, electron-
ic devices, machines, transportation equipment. 
According to PIIE estimates, the tariffs may cover 
goods worth around US$46 billion. In response 
to this move, on 4 April China threatened to 
impose a 25% tariff on 106 main categories of 
goods imported from the US, including in the 
agricultural and food processing sector (for ex-
ample soybeans, cereals, beef, fruit, tobacco), 
the automotive sector (combustion-engine cars 
and electric cars), as well as chemical and avi-
ation sectors. On 15 June, the US announced 
that on 6 July it will impose tariffs to cover im-
ports worth US$34 billion. On 13 July, a deci-
sion is expected regarding the expansion of the 
list of tariffs to include goods worth US$16 bil-
lion, to be imposed in August 2018. Based on 
data from 2017, China’s retaliatory tariffs could 
cover American exports worth US$49.8 billion. 
The Chinese tariffs are targeted at those sectors 
of the American economy that concentrate in re-
gions where Trump’s approval rating is relatively 
high (foodstuff production in the Midwestern 
states). Should these tariffs be imposed by both 
sides, the limitations would cover around 15% 
of bilateral trade. In response to China’s retorts, 
Trump threatened to expand the list further to 
include goods worth US$100 billion (while not 
naming any specific categories), and later in-
creased this figure to US$200 billion.
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